The more realistic question is whether Indonesia can help slow the climb, widening the space for restraint before escalation crosses a dangerous threshold.
A time exposure photograph shows trails and explosions on Feb. 28, 2026, from projectile interceptions by Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system over Tel Aviv. (AFP/Jack Guez)
After the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran last week, the Middle East moved another step up the escalation ladder. What began as calibrated retaliation now risks hardening into a broader confrontation.
The question facing the world is no longer who struck first, but whether this crisis can still be contained, or whether we are witnessing the early stages of a conflict that could redraw the geopolitical map.
For Indonesia, this is not a distant geopolitical drama. Instability in the Middle East would send shockwaves through global energy markets, disrupt supply chains and strain already fragile economic recovery across developing countries. In an interconnected world, regional wars do not remain regional for long.
Strategic theory reminds us that large wars rarely erupt in a single dramatic leap. In On Escalation, Herman Kahn described conflict as a climb up an “escalation ladder”, with each rung representing a deliberate choice. Even at moments of acute tension, leaders retain agency: they can intensify, pause or step back. The danger lies not only in hostility itself, but in the steady normalization of moving upward.
Deterrence may delay catastrophe, but it does not create dialogue. When fear dominates decision-making, miscalculation becomes more likely. Preventing escalation therefore requires more than military signaling; it requires diplomatic oxygen. This is where middle powers matter.
Indonesia’s long-standing “independent and active” (bebas aktif) foreign policy gives it a distinctive diplomatic position. As the country with the world's largest Muslim population, a democracy, and a member of the G20, Jakarta maintains credibility in parts of the Islamic world while sustaining functional engagement with Western powers. Few countries navigate these political spaces with similar flexibility.
Yet moral standing alone is insufficient. Indonesia lacks coercive leverage over Washington, Tel Aviv or Tehran. It cannot impose restraint. Its comparative advantage lies in facilitation: sustaining communication, shaping norms and mobilizing coalitions that favor de-escalation. That role, however, must be proactive rather than rhetorical.
Probably Indonesia should consider appointing a special envoy dedicated to Middle East de-escalation, tasked with maintaining open channels with all relevant actors. Jakarta should push for an emergency ministerial meeting within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to consolidate a unified call for restraint.
At the same time, the Foreign Ministry must intensify shuttle diplomacy, engaging key capitals to ensure that communication persists even at moments of peak tension. These steps would not transform Indonesia into a power broker, but they would signal seriousness of purpose.
Such measures may appear modest compared to the scale of the crisis. They will not dominate headlines. But history shows that many protracted conflicts end not through decisive victory, but through exhaustion and the search for face-saving exits. Dialogue rarely begins at the top of the escalation ladder; it must be nurtured before parties reach it.
However, Indonesia does face constraints. Its consistent support for Palestinian independence may shape perceptions in Israel regarding its neutrality. Yet Jakarta has no direct record of hostility with either Israel or Iran. In diplomacy, perceptions are not fixed. They can be managed through careful messaging that emphasizes humanitarian principles, regional stability and the shared economic risks of further escalation.
There is also a strategic rationale closer to home. The credibility of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a stabilizing force depends in part on whether its largest member demonstrates commitment to peaceful conflict resolution beyond Southeast Asia. A passive Indonesia would narrow its diplomatic relevance at a time when middle-power engagement is increasingly necessary.
The question, then, is not whether Indonesia can single-handedly halt a war. It cannot. The more realistic question is whether it can help slow the climb, widening the space for restraint before escalation crosses a dangerous threshold.
Amid shifting geopolitical contours, leadership is measured less by volume than by steadiness. Preventing a crisis from moving one rung higher on the escalation ladder can be as consequential as reversing it altogether. For Indonesia, de-escalation diplomacy is not merely a moral aspiration. It is a strategic imperative.
***
By Julian Aldrin Pasha
Article published in The Jakarta Post on March 5, 2026.
