

ASEAN BRIEFS

Expecting a New ASEAN Milestone:
Assessing the Myanmar Crisis
under Cambodia's ASEAN Chairmanship



Vol. 8/ Issue 1/ March 2022



ASEAN Briefs is a regular publication about current developments on ASEAN regionalism, especially in the Political-Security, Economic as well as Socio-Cultural Pillars.

**The Habibie Center -
ASEAN Studies Program ASEAN Briefs**

Project Supervisor:

Mohammad Hasan Ansori

(Executive Director)

Julia Novrita

(Director for Program and Development)

Researcher:

Luthfy Ramiz

Marina Ika Sari

Design and Publication:

Mayka R.



From Military Takeovers to Humanitarian Crises

Myanmar has a long history of military takeovers since gaining independence in 1948. In 1962, the Myanmar military, under the leadership of General Ne Win, overthrew the democratically elected government headed by Prime Minister U Nu. According to General Ne Win, the decision to seize power was triggered by a range of economic concerns and the potential disintegration of Myanmar, including ethnic factionalism. The coup in 1962 did not result in bloodshed.¹ However, the economic situation in Myanmar deteriorated the following years after the coup, causing nationwide protests and riots across the country.

Deteriorating economic conditions caused massive upheaval. The Myanmar military (commonly referred to as the Tatmadaw) seized power from General Ne Win's government after months of civilian protests between May and August 1988 after the uprising or known as the 8888 Uprising. Led by General Saw Maung, the military-led State Law and Order Restoration Council took power in September that year, imposing martial law and deploying the army to crack down on protestors.² It resulted in an estimated 3,000 deaths³ and is considered to be the most brutal act of military violence in

Myanmar's history.

In 2010, elections were held and a new civilian government was established, marking Myanmar's transition from military-backed rule to civilian democracy. The country also embarked on large-scale social, economic, and political reforms, including the formation of the National Human Rights Commission, and the signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with many of the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest. The civilian rule lasted till 1 February 2021, when the military, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing seized power and overthrew the National League for Democracy (NLD) government.

The 2021 military takeover came roughly two months after the NLD's landslide victory in the November 2020 general election. The party won 396 of the 476 parliamentary seats, surpassing its victory in the 2015 general elections.⁴ Although with very little evidence, the military rejected these results alleging election fraud, and demanded a re-vote. Myanmar's Union Election Commission (UEC), however, rejected the allegation.⁵ On 1 February 2021, State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other NLD leaders were arrested and placed under house arrest, while the military handed power to Senior General

Min Aung Hlaing.⁶ The military also declared a year-long state of emergency, which was later extended until August 2023. Finally, the military government pledged to hold new elections and restore democracy in the country once the state of emergency has been lifted.⁷

Myanmar's Economic and Humanitarian Crisis

The 2021 military takeover sparked a wave of violent protests across Myanmar, as opposition activists rejected the military rule and demanded the restoration of democracy.⁸ Protestors engaged in street demonstrations, social media campaigns, and silent strikes.⁹ The Myanmar military responded by implementing curfews, restricting crowd gatherings, cutting off internet access to limit information sharing, deploying armored vehicles, and using rubber bullets, tear gas, and live ammunition to disperse protestors.¹⁰ A year since the military takeover, Myanmar's economy has been in rapid decline and the humanitarian situation has been deteriorating. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), nearly 1,500 people have died and 11,838 have been arrested since February 2021.¹¹ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted that the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) has doubled since February 2021 and some 440,000 people have been newly displaced since then.¹² A total of 6.2 million people are expected to need emergency humanitarian assistance this year.¹³

The ongoing crisis in Myanmar has been exacerbated by the military government's policies, making it difficult to both access and distribute humanitarian aid within the country.¹⁴ According to international nongovernmental organizations such as Refugees International

and Human Rights Watch, the military has blocked the distribution of humanitarian aid, placed travel restrictions on humanitarian workers, and imposed a number of other restrictions that had an indirect impact on aid distribution.¹⁵ Since October 2021, restrictions have also been imposed on banking, internet access, and telecommunications services, while there is increased supervision of fund transfers to both domestic and international nongovernmental organizations. These restrictions, coupled with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, led to a socioeconomic crisis,¹⁶ with Myanmar's economy shrinking 30 percent within a year of the military takeover and the Myanmar Kyat lost 25 percent of its value against the US dollar.¹⁷

International response to Myanmar Crisis

The international community's reaction to the military takeover and human rights violations varied by country and included verbal criticisms, imposition of economic sanctions, neutral statements, and refusal to interfere in Myanmar's internal affairs. On the one hand, the United Nations, the European Union, and a number of countries, including the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, South Korea, and Japan condemned the military's seizure of power, highlighting it as an act that undermines democracy and violates human rights.¹⁸ These countries imposed travel bans, asset freezes, and prohibitions from making funds available to businesses and individuals closely associated with the Myanmar military.¹⁹ China and Russia, on the other hand, urged the United States to "stop unilateral intimidation", limit their interference in Myanmar's internal affairs, and abandon confrontation in the region.²⁰ China argued that

international sanctions would only make things worse in Myanmar.

At the regional level, the situation has drawn a mixed response from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. Countries, such as Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines said that the military takeover is an internal affair and it does need external intervention. Although recently, Thailand's position has also subtly shifted. Meanwhile, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia called on relevant parties to exercise restraint and resolve disputes through peaceful dialogue.²¹

ASEAN's Collective Actions to Address Myanmar Crisis

Despite divergent views amongst its member countries, ASEAN has taken four major steps in its response to the political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar:

Step 1	On 2 March 2021, ASEAN foreign ministers held talks with representatives of the Myanmar military, highlighting the need to promote peaceful dialogue and de-escalate violence. They published a joint statement that called on all parties concerned to refrain from instigating further acts of violence.
Step 2	<p>On 24 April 2021, ASEAN held a high-level summit to discuss the crisis situation in Myanmar. The Summit, which was attended by leaders of ASEAN member states and Myanmar military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, announced the following Five-Point Consensus:²²</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. There shall be immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint;2. Constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people;3. A special envoy of the ASEAN chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN;4. ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre); and5. The special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned. <p>The Five-Point Consensus was seen as the first step towards establishing a transparent and inclusive dialogue between ASEAN member states and Myanmar's military government.²³ It was also an important moment for ASEAN's credibility and political stability in the region. Unfortunately, there has been no significant progress in the implementation of the consensus since its adoption last year.</p>


	<p>In fact, the consensus failed to address escalating violence in Myanmar throughout 2021 due to resistance from the country’s military government. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), violent assaults involving the Myanmar military, People’s Defense Forces, civilians, and other armed organizations continue to take place across the country and became more intense, including in the southeast, north, northwest and central Myanmar as well as the Rakhine State.²⁴</p>
<p>Step 3</p>	<p>On 4 June 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, ASEAN Secretary-General, Lim Jock Hoi, and the Second Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam, Erywan Yusof attended held a special meeting. However, this minilateral approach failed to produce any results. In fact, the meeting drew criticism from Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) —a shadow government representing lawmakers elected in the November 2020 elections—for its failure to involve other political entities in the country.</p>
<p>Step 4</p>	<p>On 4 August 2021, ASEAN appointed Erywan Yusof as a special envoy for Myanmar. He was tasked with ending violence in the country, opening dialogue between the military and its opponents, establishing the ASEAN centrality, as well as monitoring the distribution of humanitarian aid in Myanmar.²⁵ However, Erywan Yusof canceled the visit to Myanmar after the military government announced that he would not be allowed to meet Aung San Suu Kyi.²⁶ The government announced that a visit permit would be granted once the situation in Myanmar stabilizes.²⁷</p>

ASEAN response to Myanmar’s lack of progress

In what many see as ASEAN’s strongest rebuke to Myanmar till date, the 10-member regional group excluded the country’s military leaders from attending the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits in October 2021. Instead, a non-political figure from Myanmar was invited to the Summit. ASEAN’s decision highlighted Myanmar’s lack of progress in implementing the Five-Point Consensus.

In response, Myanmar’s military government announced that the country will not participate in the summit as a form of protest. The government also announced that it would refuse to “accept any outcomes of the meeting contrary to the provisions, objectives, and principles of the ASEAN Charter”,²⁸ including ASEAN’s call to violence and implement the Five-Point Consensus. The ASEAN Summit eventually took place without Myanmar’s presence.²⁹

The political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar is widely seen as a test for ASEAN’s credibility and unity. On the one hand, each member state’s commitment to upholding democracy,



good governance, law, and human rights, as stated in Article 1(7) of the ASEAN Charter, is required to make any meaningful progress in Myanmar. At the same time, the regional body must also comply with Article 2 (e) of its charter, which states that member countries cannot interfere in each other's internal affairs.³⁰ The ASEAN Charter, adopted in 2007, does not include guidelines on how to respond to military takeovers in member countries.³¹

The tension to uphold these values has rendered ASEAN's measures minimized within the Myanmar crisis.³² While ASEAN took the measures towards the ongoing problems in Myanmar, the military junta, as the caretaker of Myanmar's government, showed questionable commitment to follow them. However, reviewing ASEAN's previous experiences with Myanmar during the Cyclone Nargis disaster in 2008 where it succeeded to broker an agreement and persuade Myanmar to open up for humanitarian aid from outside, ASEAN had practically broken the barrier by interfering with Myanmar's policy in rejecting search and rescue team from foreign countries.³³

Cambodia's Approach as the 2022 ASEAN Chair

As the new chair of ASEAN, resolving the economic and political turmoil in Myanmar through consensus and the guiding principles of the ASEAN Charter are core areas of focus for Cambodia in 2022. In December 2021, Cambodia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a press conference to emphasize ASEAN's central role in promoting dialogue and creating a trust to reduce violence and deliver humanitarian assistance in Myanmar.³⁴

On 7 January 2022, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Myanmar, the first visit by a head of government since the army seized power from the NLD government last year. The Prime Minister, along with ASEAN special envoy for Myanmar, Prak Sokhonn, met with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and officials of the State Administration Council (SAC), sparking nationwide protests and demonstrations.³⁵

The two-day visit also drew criticism from ASEAN members—Malaysian Foreign Minister, Saifuddin Abdullah, expressed concern that the Cambodian Prime Minister’s visit to Myanmar could be seen as legitimizing the country’s military government and that Cambodia should have consulted other ASEAN leaders before visiting Myanmar.³⁶ This triggered the postponement of the 2022 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat from January 18-19 to February 17.³⁷

In its role as the new ASEAN Chair, Cambodia indicated that it wanted to invite Myanmar’s military government to the retreat and engage in dialogue, but on the condition that progress would be made on the Five-Point Consensus. However, this decision came under intense pressure from ASEAN members such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore who urged the regional block to not give way to the consensus supported by the United Nations and the United States.³⁸ In the end, a non-political representative from Myanmar was invited, but the military government refused to participate. The Myanmar crisis and lack of progress on the Five-Point Consensus were the key areas of focus at the otherwise low-key retreat.³⁹

Myanmar’s SAC roadmap

Although Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit to Myanmar received a mixed response from ASEAN members, it opened up an opportunity to engage in dialogue with the military government. This included dialogue on extending ceasefire agreements between the army and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) until the end of 2022, and holding consultative meetings with the ASEAN special envoy for Myanmar, ASEAN Secretary-General,

representatives of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre), Myanmar National Task Force, Myanmar Red Cross, and UN agencies on humanitarian aid. The two countries also discussed Cambodia’s experiences with its internal peace process.

During the visit, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing guaranteed ASEAN special envoy’s visit to Myanmar. He also highlighted the State Administration Council (SAC) Roadmap issued on 1 February 2021. The roadmap provides policies and measures to:⁴⁰

1. Investigate election commissions and voter lists;
2. Continue COVID-19 preventive measures, including vaccinations;
3. Assist business entities affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and implement existing investment agreements;
4. Expand armistice agreements with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs); and
5. Carry out free and fair elections after the national emergency ends, and transfer power to the party that won the election.

Cambodia’s decision to engage in dialogue with Myanmar has helped ‘thaw’ relations between ASEAN members and Myanmar’s military government, which were practically frozen since the takeover in February 2021. For example, post-Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit to Myanmar, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced that ASEAN’s special envoy will be allowed meet select NLD representatives during his visit from 20-23 March 2022.⁴¹ This gradual improvement in Myanmar-ASEAN relations has the potential to restart the process of implementing the Five-Point Consensus, provided further dialogue and trust-building measures continue to take place.

The Cambodian approach to addressing the Myanmar crisis included the formation of a tripartite committee consisting of representatives from Cambodia, Brunei Darussalam, and Indonesia, the former, current, and future ASEAN chairs. According to Prime Minister Hun Sen, the tripartite committee has been formed to mediate and extend the ceasefire agreement in Myanmar until the end of 2022.⁴² Mediation through a tripartite committee was previously implemented by ASEAN to facilitate the Cambodian peace process in 1997.

Both Cambodia and Myanmar share some similarities. In addition to the fact that they are both part of the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) group, they also have a history of internal political disruptions and military takeovers. In 1997, Cambodia was in political turmoil after its co-premier Norodom Ranariddh was overthrown by the other co-premier Hun Sen, leading to military involvement and a series of violent outbreaks in several parts of the country. When it became evident that the political situation in Cambodia was becoming a threat to regional stability, ASEAN, through an agreement produced in the Asian Regional Forum (ARF)⁴³ and with the support of its partners, handled the crisis.

The ASEAN used its principle of non-interference, as mandated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), to address the Cambodian crisis. In addition, the tripartite committee comprising the Philippines Foreign Minister, Domingo Siazon, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and Thai Foreign Minister, Prachuab Chaiyasarn were also instrumental in handling the crisis. The tripartite was tasked with developing a mediation mechanism and facilitating the peace process in Cambodia with

the support of ASEAN dialogue partners and Friends of Cambodia, an ad hoc group made up of Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. The group proposed solutions, including a security guarantee to Norodom Ranariddh, fair elections, and protection for all parties participating in elections.⁴⁴

As the ASEAN chair, Cambodia's success in addressing the economic, political, and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar must be continuously examined, given the complex and rapidly evolving situation in Myanmar. In addition, Cambodia's performance as the leader of the regional group and its ability to effectively handle ASEAN members' internal affairs can be assessed after its tenure is completed at the end of 2022. If the Myanmar crisis cannot be resolved this year, it will be a top priority for Indonesia in its role as the ASEAN chair in 2023. It is crucial that ASEAN member countries work together to facilitate a peaceful solution to the ongoing economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar.


Recommendation

1. ASEAN had disregarded its principle of non-interference during Cyclone Nargis in 2008. It must exercise similar flexibility in implementing this principle in other humanitarian crisis situations, including the ongoing situation in Myanmar. In addition, ASEAN should harmonize the implementation of other principles listed in its charter, including the principle of good governance and respect for democracy and human rights.

2. Cambodia needs to work closely with ASEAN's special envoy for Myanmar to build trust and establish communication with stakeholders in the country, including key individuals from both the military and NLD. If needed, the special envoy and NLD members can organize meetings outside Myanmar or via political intermediaries, as the NLD is still largely blocked within Myanmar. Importantly, the voices of civil society organizations and the Myanmar people must be included in this process.

3. Cambodia should encourage the formation of a tripartite committee in the Myanmar crisis to create a more impactful mediation process. The tripartite committee could focus on initiating a mediation road map and timeframe for Myanmar in implementing the Five-Point Consensus. This discourse can be developed based on the past experiences and measures undertaken during Cambodia's peace process. Cambodia must also mobilize the support and commitment of ASEAN dialogue partners to promote this mediation process.

4. Indonesia needs to play a more active role to promote the steps taken by Cambodia. If the Myanmar crisis cannot be resolved this year, Indonesia, as the upcoming ASEAN chair, should build on the efforts made by Cambodia and pursue other ways of communication to persuade Myanmar to follow ASEAN measures to the crisis.






Endnotes

- 1 LaFantasie, G., Sampson, C., & Miller, J. (1994). *Foreign relations of the United States, 1961-1963* (23rd ed.). United States Government Printing Office.
- 2 Ferrara, F. (2003). Why Regimes Create Disorder: Hobbes's Dilemma During a Rangoon Summer. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47(3), 302-325. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002703047003003>.
- 3 Hadiz, V. (2006). *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* by Vincent Boudreau Cambridge University Press. *Social Forces*, 84(4), 2356-2357. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2006.0091>.
- 4 Kinasih, S. (2022). *Sejarah Membuktikan Militer Myanmar Memang Gatal Kudeta*. tirtoid. Retrieved 28 February 2022, from <https://tirtoid/sejarah-membuktikan-militer-myanmar-memang-gatal-kudeta-f91X>.
- 5 Strangio, S. (2022). *Amid Coup Fears, Myanmar's Election Commission Rejects Army Election Fraud Claims*. TheDiplomat.com. Retrieved 27 April 2022, from <https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/amid-coup-fears-myanmars-election-commission-rejects-army-election-fraud-claims/>.
- 6 Kompas.com. (2022). *Awal Mula Kerusuhan Myanmar: Dipicu Kudeta, Militer Berkuasa*. Kompas.com. Retrieved 28 February 2022, from <https://www.kompas.com/global/read/2021/09/17/162024770/awal-mula-kerusuhan-myanmar-dipicu-kudeta-militer-berkuasa?page=all>.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 BBC News Indonesia. (2022). *Anak-anak muda di jantung protes Myanmar: 'Kami tak mau kembali ke masa gelap di bawah diktator'*. BBC News Indonesia. Retrieved 28 February 2022, from <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia-56292578>.
- 9 NHK WORLD-JAPAN News. (2022). *Kudeta Myanmar: Satu Tahun Berlalu, Perlawanan Berlanjut*. NHK WORLD. Retrieved 28 February 2022, from <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/id/news/backstories/1905/>.
- 10 BBC News Indonesia. (2022). *Anak-anak muda di jantung protes Myanmar*.
- 11 Reuters. (2022). *Factbox: Myanmar's Post-coup Crisis in Numbers*. Reuters. Retrieved 28 February 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-post-coup-crisis-numbers-2022-01-31/>.
- 12 Number of internally displaced in Myanmar doubles, to 800,000. UN News. (2022). Retrieved 27 April 2022, from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1111812>.
- 13 Reuters. (2022). *Factbox: Myanmar's Post-coup Crisis in Numbers*. Reuters. Retrieved 28 February 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-post-coup-crisis-numbers-2022-01-31/>.
- 14 Sullivan, D. P. (2021). *Dire Consequences: Addressing the Humanitarian Fallout from Myanmar's Coup* (p. 8). Refugees International. Retrieved from <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5t/61704056d5c2b338bb5d6744/1634746454791/Dire+Consequences+Addressing+the+Humanitarian+Fallout+from+Myanmar%E2%80%99s+Coup.pdf>.
- 15 Strangio, S. (2021). *Report: Myanmar Junta Restricting 'Lifesaving' Humanitarian Aid*. The Diplomat. Retrieved 25 February 2022, from <https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/report-myanmar-junta-restricting-lifesaving-humanitarian-aid/>.
- 16 Sullivan, D. P. (2021). *Dire Consequences: Addressing the Humanitarian Fallout from Myanmar's Coup* (p. 9).
- 17 Reuters. (2022). *Factbox: Myanmar's Post-coup Crisis in Numbers*.
- 18 NHK WORLD-JAPAN News. (2022). *Kudeta Myanmar: Satu Tahun Berlalu, Perlawanan Berlanjut*.
- 19 Deutsche Welle. (2022). *Uni Eropa dan Inggris Jatuhkan Sanksi Baru untuk Pejabat Militer Myanmar*. DW. Retrieved 2 March 2022, from <https://www.dw.com/id/ue-inggris-jatuhkan-sanksi-baru-untuk-pejabat-junta-myanmar/a-57987340>.
- 20 Republika Online. (2022). *China dan Rusia Dukung Myanmar Cari Solusi Politik*. Republika Online. Retrieved 2 March 2022, from <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/qqgmnp382/china-dan-rusia-dukung-myanmar-cari-solusi-politik>.
- 21 Kapur, R. (2022). *ASEAN and Myanmar: No Sign of Progress*. Lowy Institute. Retrieved 2 March 2022, from <https://www.loyyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/asean-and-myanmar-no-sign-progress>.
- 22 ASEAN Secretariat. (2021). *Chairman's Statement on the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting*. Retrieved from <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf>.
- 23 Kompas.com. (2022). *Menlu: Implementasi 5 Poin Konsensus Myanmar Tak Ada Kemajuan Signifikan*. Kompas.com. Retrieved 5 March 2022, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/02/17/17061431/menlu-implementasi-5-poin-konsensus-myanmar-tak-ada-kemajuan-signifikan>.
- 24 UNHCR Regional Bureau for Asia and Pacific (RBAP). (2022). *Myanmar Emergency Update* (p. 1). UNHCR. Retrieved from <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Myanmar%20Emergency%20Update%20-%2019%20January%202022.pdf>.
- 25 Allard, T. (2022). *ASEAN appoints Brunei diplomat as envoy to Myanmar*. Reuters. Retrieved 6 March 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-appoints-bruneis-erywan-yusof-envoy-myanmar-sources-2021-08-04/>.
- 26 Strangio, S. (2022). *ASEAN Envoy Cancels Planned Myanmar Trip Due to Junta Stonewalling*. The Diplomat. Retrieved 6 March 2022, from <https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/asean-envoy-cancels-planned-myanmar-trip-due-to-junta-stonewalling/>.
- 27 Harmer, J. (2021). *ASEAN Envoys Meet Myanmar Junta Leader to Press for Dialogue*. AP NEWS. Retrieved 3 March 2022, from <https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-business-global-trade-eb277280603f65d4b3ba-ca9509555548>.



Endnotes

- 28 Geddie, J., Richardson, A., & MacSwan, A. (2021). *Myanmar decries move to block junta leader from regional summit*. Reuters. Retrieved 3 March 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-rejects-asean-decision-exclude-junta-leader-summit-2021-10-22/>.
- 29 Tempo.co. (2021). *KTT ASEAN Dimulai Tanpa Perwakilan dari Myanmar*. Tempo.co. Retrieved 6 March 2022, from <https://dunia.tempo.co/read/1521406/ktt-asean-dimulai-tanpa-perwakilan-dari-myanmar>.
- 30 ASEAN Secretariat. (2008). *The ASEAN Charter*. Retrieved from <https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>.
- 31 Kapur, R. (2022). *ASEAN and Myanmar: No Sign of Progress*.
- 32 Putri, A., Jasmine, P., Salma, R., Bagasta, G. and Faturrahman, M., 2021. *Dampak Prinsip-Prinsip Dasar ASEAN Terhadap Pola Kerjasama ASEAN Menghadapi Krisis Kudeta Myanmar*. Nation State: Journal of International Studies, 4(1), pp.117-139.
- 33 *A Humanitarian Call*. Humanitarianlibrary.org. (2010). Retrieved 27 April 2022, from https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/a_humanitarian_call.pdf.
- 34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of Cambodia. (2022). *Press Release: Briefing on Cambodia's ASEAN Chairmanship in 2022*. Retrieved from <https://www.mfaic.gov.kh/posts/2021-12-31-Press-Release-Briefing-on-Cambodia-s-ASEAN-Chairmanship-in-2022-on-29-December-2021--10-53-43>.
- 35 Tempo.co. (2022). *Kunjungi Myanmar, Hun Sen Jadi Kepala Negara Pertama yang Temui Pemimpin Junta*. Tempo.co. Retrieved 12 March 2022, from <https://dunia.tempo.co/read/1547519/kunjungi-myanmar-hun-sen-jadi-kepala-negara-pertama-yang-temui-pemimpin-junta/full&view=ok>.
- 36 Al Jazeera. (2022). *Voices of Concern at ASEAN over Hun Sen's Myanmar Visit*. Al Jazeera. Retrieved 12 March 2022, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/14/concern-in-asean-over-cambodia-pms-myanmar-visit-malaysia-minister-says>.
- 37 Republika Online. (2022). *ASEAN Retreat Dimulai, Myanmar Masih Jadi Isu Utama*. Republika Online. Retrieved 12 March 2022, from <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/r7fuc9370/asean-retreat-dimulai-myanmar-masih-jadi-isu-utama>.
- 38 The Jakarta Post. (2022). *Hun Sen Urges Myanmar Junta Chief to Allow Aid, Envoy Visit*. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved 15 March 2022, from <https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/01/26/hun-sen-urges-myanmar-junta-chief-to-allow-aid-envoy-visit.html>.
- 39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. (2022). *Press Briefing Menlu RI: ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Retreat*. Retrieved from <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/3338/berita/press-briefing-menlu-ri-asean-foreign-ministers-retreat>.
- 40 Htwe, C., & Htet, K. (2021). *Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to Maintain Foreign, Economic Policies*. The Myanmar Times. Retrieved 8 March 2022, from <https://www.mmtimes.com/news/senior-general-min-aung-hlaing-maintain-foreign-economic-policies.html>.
- 41 Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government. (2022). *Press Release on the Visit of Special Envoy of the ASEAN Myanmar Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government*. Retrieved 24 March 2022, from <https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/2022/03/22/press-release-on-the-visit-of-special-envoy-of-the-asean-chair-to-myanmar/>.
- 42 Sochan, R. (2022). *PM Eyes Myanmar Peace Troika*. Phnompenhpost.com. Retrieved 10 March 2022, from <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/pm-eyes-myanmar-peace-troika>.
- 43 Peou, S. (1998). *Diplomatic pragmatism: ASEAN's response to the July 1997 coup*. Accord: Safeguarding Peace Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge, (5), 32. Retrieved 27 April 2022, from https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Accord%20Cambodia_Diplomatic%20pragmatism.pdf.
- 44 Merican, D. (2007). *Cambodia's Engagement with ASEAN: Lessons for Timor Leste*. CICP Working Paper, (14), 12-14. Retrieved 10 March 2022, from <https://cicp.org.kh/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CICP-working-paper-14-Cambodias-Engagement-in-ASEAN-by-Din-Merican.pdf>.



Check out our latest edition of *ASEAN Briefs* and download at www.habibiecenter.or.id

About The Habibie Center

The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values. The mission of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.

About ASEAN Studies Program


The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights. The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

About Talking ASEAN


Talking ASEAN is a monthly public dialogue held at The Habibie Center in Jakarta. Covering a wide array of issues related to ASEAN, Talking ASEAN addresses topics of: Economic Integration, Socio-cultural, & Democracy, human rights and regional peace, among others. Featuring local and visiting experts, Talking ASEAN is one of a series of twelve dialogues regularly held each month and open to a target audience consisting of ASEAN officials, foreign ambassadors & diplomats, academics, university students, businesses, and the media.

Cover Image:
(AsiaNews)

For more publications
please check our website:
www.habibiecenter.or.id



Subscribe to our  YouTube channel:
The Habibie Center



www.habibiecenter.or.id



ASEAN Studies Program - The Habibie Center

The Habibie Center Building - Jl. Kemang Selatan No.98, Jakarta 12560
Tel: 62 21 781 7211 | Fax: 62 21 781 7212 | Email: thc@habibiecenter.or.id

 facebook.com/habibiecenter  [@habibiecenter](https://twitter.com/habibiecenter)  [@habibiecenter](https://www.instagram.com/habibiecenter)